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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGouqh*
and Elinor H. Hitt *
This Article addresses significant case law that arose during the
survey period.' There were no statutory changes specific to domestic
relations during this period, though substantial changes were made to
the evidence code.
I. DISCOVERY
Both appellate courts have recently reviewed the case of Rutter v.
Rutter,' a case which initially appeared as if it would have a significant
impact on the way evidence is obtained in divorce and custody litigation.' During the parties' divorce, the wife installed surveillance
cameras in the marital residence.' The husband's motion to exclude
evidence derived from these cameras was denied.'
The husband turned to the Georgia Court of Appeals arguing that the
wife's use of these cameras violates section 16-11-62(2)7 of the Official
Code of Georgia (O.C.G.A.), which makes it generally unlawful for one

* Partner in the firm of Warner, Bates, McGough, McGinnis & Portnoy, Atlanta,
Georgia. University of California at Berkeley (A.B., 1963); University of California (LL.B.,
1966). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Warner, Bates, McGough, McGinnis & Portnoy, Atlanta,
Georgia. University of Georgia (B.S.Ed., 1993); University of Georgia (M.S.W., 1996);
Georgia State University (J.D., 2007). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia domestic relations law during the prior survey period, see
Barry B. McGough & Elinor H. Hitt, Domestic Relations, Annual Survey of Georgia Law,
64 MERCER L. REV. 121 (2012).
2. O.C.G.A. tit. 24 (2013).

3. No. S12G1915, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 779, at *1 (Ga. Oct. 7, 2013); 316 Ga. App. 894, 730
S.E.2d 626 (2012), rev'd by 2013 Ga. LEXIS 779, at *1, reconsiderationdenied by 2013 Ga.
LEXIS 904 (Ga. Nov. 4, 2013).
4. See Rutter, 316 Ga. App. at 894, 730 S.E.2d at 628.
5. Rutter, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 779, at *1.
6.

Id.

7. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62(2) (2011).
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to conduct video surveillance of another in a private place, out of public
view and without his consent.' The wife argued that the statute
subsection, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62(2)(C), provides an exception to a general
prohibition and provides that it is lawful "[tlo use for security purposes,
crime prevention, or crime detection any device to observe, photograph,
or record the activities of persons who are within the curtilage of the
residence of the person using such device."9
As a threshold matter, the court of appeals considered whether based
on legislative history, subparagraph (2)(C) of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62 had
been repealed by a more recent legislative enactment, an issue briefed
by the parties, the Attorney General and the Office of Legislative
Counsel as amici curiae.10 After a lengthy review, the court of appeals
determined that subparagraph (2)(C) was still good law, and then
affirmed the lower court, finding that subparagraph 2(C) was properly
applied in denying the husband's motion to exclude.n Based on this
opinion, the wife's act of installing surveillance cameras in the marital
residence was allowable in this circumstance, and the evidence derived
therefrom, potentially admissible. 12
Shortly thereafter, the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and
came to a different result." The supreme court determined that
subparagraph (2)(C) of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62 did not survive a subsequent
amendment to the statute, and that the court of appeals erred in ruling
otherwise.1
Thus, there is no exception to the general prohibition
against conducting video surveillance of another in a private place, out
of public view and without his consent. The wife's surveillance cameras
are arguably no longer allowable, and similarly, neither is any evidence
obtained therefrom.
II.

CHILD CUSTODY, MODIFICATION

Two court of appeals cases speak to jurisdiction of custody modification
proceedings. In Hammonds v. Parks," the father had been awarded
primary physical custody of the parties' child by the Superior Court of
DeKalb County in 2009.16 In 2011, the father filed a petition for

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Rutter, 316 Ga. App. at 894, 730 S.E.2d at 628.
Id. at 899, 730 S.E.2d at 631 (quoting O.C.G.A.
Id. at 894-95, 730 S.E.2d at 628-29.
Id. at 898, 902, 730 S.E.2d at 631, 633.
Id. at 901, 730 S.E.2d at 633.
Rutter, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 779, at *1, *4.
Id.
319 Ga. App. 792, 735 S.E.2d 801 (2012).
Id. at 792, 735 S.E.2d at 803.

§ 16-11-62(2)(C)).
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contempt in DeKalb County, alleging that the mother violated the
custody order. At the hearing, the mother orally requested the court to
award her custody of the child. The father objected, stating that the
superior court could not hear a change-in-custody petition brought
against him because he was not a resident of DeKalb County. Nevertheless, the superior court heard the oral motion and found the mother in
contempt, but awarded her temporary custody of the child."
The court of appeals held that the superior court was without
jurisdiction to change custody because such a proceeding should have
occurred in the father's county of residence."8 The mother failed to
bring the motion in the correct county and also failed, under O.C.G.A.
§ 19-9-23,19 to request the change in custody in a separate action.o
The superior court erred in holding that the father waived his right to
contest the change-in-custody request by bringing a contempt petition
against the mother in DeKalb County because the father never
consented to the inclusion of custody matters in the action for contempt. 21 The mother's motion for change in custody was improper, and
the court of appeals reversed the superior court's order."
A different result occurred in Colbert v. Colbert.2' A Fulton County
divorce decree granted primary physical custody of the children to the
mother. The mother later filed a petition in the Superior Court of
Clayton County, where the father resided, seeking modification of child
support and a motion to hold the father in contempt. The father
counterclaimed for modification of custody, and the superior court
granted his motion, giving him primary physical custody and requiring
the mother to pay child support. The mother appealed, arguing lack of
jurisdiction with regard to the superior court's ruling on custody.
Although O.C.G.A. § 19-9-23 does not allow custody modification to be
made as a counterclaim to a motion seeking to enforce a child custody
order, the court of appeals held that the mother had effectively waived
the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction because there was no record
that the mother objected to the superior court's consideration of the

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 793, 735 S.E.2d at 803.
Id. at 794, 735 S.E.2d at 804.
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-23 (2010).
Hammonds, 319 Ga. App. at 794, 735 S.E.2d at 804 (citing O.C.G.A.
Id. at 794-95, 735 S.E.2d at 804.
Id. at 795, 735 S.E.2d at 804.
321 Ga. App. 841, 743 S.E.2d 505 (2013).
Id. at 841, 743 S.E.2d at 507.

§ 19-9-23).

110

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

father's counterclaim for custody before or during trial.25 The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling."
Several cases discuss whether evidence is required to authorize a
change in custody. In Andersen v. Farrington," the Georgia Supreme
Court upheld a judgment of the Superior Court of Forsyth County
holding that the mother's failure to pay child support and failure to
communicate with the children was sufficient evidence to authorize a
change in custody." The supreme court also upheld the requirement
that the mother cover the costs of a custody evaluation before it would
consider how she could visit with the children.29 "Reasonable" restrictions on visitation are within the court's discretion.o
In Fifadara v. Goyal,' the court of appeals upheld the Superior
Court of DeKalb County's holding that the mother's repeated interference with the father's court-ordered parenting time, including the filing
of a false police report to prevent the father's visitation, was sufficient
to award the father legal and physical custody of the child."
In Smith v. Curtis," the father sought to reduce his child support
obligation.34 During the hearing, the father stated that he would
surrender his parental rights if he could. The Superior Court of
Gwinnett County reduced the father's child support obligation and
modified the final order so that the father did not have custody or
parenting time of any kind. On appeal, the father argued that his
parental rights were impermissibly terminated by the superior court.
The court of appeals held that the father's request to relinquish custody
could be deemed a material change in condition sufficient to modify
custody and that the lower court modified, but did not terminate, the
father's parental rights."
When considering the father's "blind
obsession [with] attacking the mother," the court held that the superior
court did not err in modifying custody."

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 841-43, 743 S.E.2d at 507-08 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-9-23).
Id. at 843, 743 S.E.2d at 508.
291 Ga. 775, 731 S.E.2d 351 (2012).
Id. at 776, 731 S.E.2d at 352.
Id. at 777, 731 S.E.2d at 352-53.
Id. at 777, 731 S.E.2d at 353.
318 Ga. App. 196, 733 S.E.2d 478 (2012).
Id. at 201, 733 S.E.2d at 482.
316 Ga. App. 890, 730 S.E.2d 604 (2012).
Id. at 891, 730 S.E.2d at 606.
Id. at 890-91, 730 S.E.2d at 606.
Id. at 892-93, 730 S.E.2d at 607.
Id. at 893-94, 730 S.E.2d at 608 (alteration in original) (quoting trial court record).
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CHILD CUSTODY, DISPUTES INVOLVING THIRD PARTIES

Three custodial disputes arose involving third parties during this
survey period. In Hastings v. Hastings,8 the parties' older child was
the biological child of the father and the adopted child of the mother,
while the younger child was the biological child of both parties.3 9 In
2011, the parties divorced, and the Superior Court of Putnam County
awarded primary physical custody of both children to the mother. The
husband appealed the court's placement of his older child with the wife,
the child's adoptive mother.o The husband argued that as a specified
third party under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1), 41 the wife was required to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the older child would suffer
physical or emotional harm if custody was awarded to the husband.42
Disagreeing with the husband, the Georgia Supreme Court held that
adoption creates the relationship of parent and child as if the adopted
child were the biological child of the adopting adult." As such,
between the biological parent and the adoptive parent, the only showing
required pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1) is what is in the best
interest of the child." The superior court did not err in awarding the
wife custody of both children because it was in the best interest of the
children to stay in the same household."
In Phillips v. Phillips," a stepfather sought custody.4 7 When the
parties married in 2006, the wife had one son, and the husband was
neither the legal nor biological father of the child. During the marriage,
the parties had a daughter. The parties filed for divorce in 2011, and a
temporary order provided that the parties share joint physical and legal
custody of the daughter. The order also awarded the wife primary
physical custody of the son while the husband was granted joint legal
custody and visitation." The Superior Court of Cobb County ordered
that the children "not be around" the wife's boyfriend.49 The husband
filed a petition for contempt and change of custody, alleging the children

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

291 Ga. 782, 732 S.E.2d 272 (2012).
Id. at 782, 732 S.E.2d at 273.
Id. at 782-83, 732 S.E.2d at 273.
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1) (2010 & Supp. 2013).
Hastings, 291 Ga. at 783, 732 S.E.2d at 273 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1)).
Id. at 784, 732 S.E.2d at 274 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19(a)(2) (2010)).
Id. at 784-85, 732 S.E.2d at 274-75 (interpreting O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19(a)(2)).
Id. at 785, 732 S.E.2d at 274-75.
316 Ga. App. 829, 730 S.E.2d 548 (2012).
Id. at 829, 730 S.E.2d at 549.
Id.
Id. (quoting the trial court's temporary order).
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were living with the wife and her boyfriend, and had been exposed to
domestic violence. Following a hearing, the superior court granted
primary physical custody of the daughter to the husband as well as
continued joint custody and visitation with the son. This order remained
in effect following a second hearing. After a third hearing, at which the
children's guardian ad litem testified, the husband was awarded sole
legal and physical custody of both children. The mother appealed."
Suggesting the need for legislative action, the court of appeals held
that, even though the superior court "went to great efforts" to determine
the son's best interests, a stepparent with no formal, legal ties to the
child cannot be awarded greater parental power than the child's
biological mother." A stepfather is not given the same status as
certain specified relatives under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1). 5 2 The court of
appeals reversed the award of custody to the husband."3
In Stone-Crosby v. Mickens-Cook," an aunt and a grandmother were
at odds."5 The minor children were orphaned by a murder-suicide.
Their aunt brought an action in the Superior Court of Fulton County
seeking custody. Twelve days later, the paternal grandmother answered
the aunt's petition and moved to intervene. Simultaneously, the
grandmother filed a deprivation petition in juvenile court and a motion
to dismiss the superior court action for lack of jurisdiction. The motion
to dismiss was denied, but the motion to intervene was granted. The
superior court awarded custody of the children to the grandmother."
On appeal, the aunt argued that the superior court lacked jurisdiction
over the custody matter because no statute provided guidance on custody
following the death of both parents." While true, the Georgia Constitution states that "[tihe superior courts shall have jurisdiction in all
cases, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution.""
The
superior court has jurisdiction over child custody actions "between
parents, parents and third parties, or between parties who are not
parents," as in this case." While the superior court's jurisdiction to
hear custody matters may be concurrent with that of the juvenile court

50. Id. at 829-30, 730 S.E.2d at 549.
51. Id. at 831-32, 730 S.E.2d at 550.
52. Id. at 831, 730 S.E.2d at 550 (interpreting O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1)).
53. Id. at 832, 730 S.E.2d at 550.
54. 318 Ga. App. 313, 733 S.E.2d 842 (2012).
55. Id. at 313, 733 S.E.2d at 843.
56. Id. at 313, 733 S.E.2d at 843-44.
57. Id. at 314, 733 S.E.2d at 844.
58. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 4, 1 1.
59. Stone-Crosby, 318 Ga. App. at 314, 733 S.E.2d at 844 (citations omitted) (quoting
Dunbar v. Ertter, 312 Ga. App. 440, 441, 718 S.E.2d 350, 351 (2011)).
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in some cases, that does not apply here.6 0 In the absence of a previously filed action in juvenile or probate court, the superior court was first
to take jurisdiction, and jurisdiction was properly retained. 61 As such,
the court of appeals affirmed the superior court.
IV.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND LEGITIMATION

In Brine v. Shipp," a question of jurisdiction as between the juvenile
court and the Superior Court of Paulding County came up again." The
mother married William Brine in 1997, weeks after a relationship
between the mother and Shipp ended. Upon learning that the mother
was pregnant, Shipp asked if he was the father, and the mother said no.
The child was born during the Brines's marriage, and William Brine was
listed as the father on the child's birth certificate. Soon after, Shipp
again inquired as to paternity of the child, and the mother denied that
Shipp was the father. Shipp did not question paternity for ten more
years. After William Brine filed for divorce, the mother told Shipp that
she thought he was the child's father, and DNA testing confirmed
Shipp's paternity. In 2011, Shipp intervened in the divorce action and
filed a petition to legitimate the child, which was granted. In the
divorce decree, Brine's rights as the legal father were terminated, and
Shipp was awarded primary physical custody. Brine appealed.
Whether the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction to sever
Brine's rights depended on whether the issue before the court primarily
involved legitimation, which is in the jurisdiction of the superior court,
or primarily involved termination, which is in the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court." Granting the legitimation petition first required the
superior court to terminate Brine's parental rights, and therefore, the
primary subject of this case was termination. As such, the supreme
court reversed the superior court's judgment." This decision overruled
Ghrist v. Fricks" and Matthews v. Dukes70 to the extent the court of
appeals in those cases determined that the superior court had jurisdic-

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 314-15, 733 S.E.2d at 844.
Id. at 315, 733 S.E.2d at 845.
Id.
291 Ga. 376, 729 S.E.2d 393 (2012).
Id. at 376, 729 S.E.2d at 394.
Id. at 376-77, 729 S.E.2d at 394.
Id. at 379, 729 S.E.2d at 396.
Id. at 380, 729 S.E.2d at 396.
Id. at 380, 729 S.E.2d at 397.
219 Ga. App. 415, 465 S.E.2d 501 (1995).
314 Ga. App. 782, 726 S.E.2d 95 (2012).
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tion to sever parental rights because the issue of termination was
ancillary to the biological father's petition for legitimation of the child."
V. CHILD SUPPORT, INITIAL DETERMINATION

The appellate courts provided guidance regarding what is considered
income for the purpose of determining child support. In Dodson v.
Walraven, 2 the father testified that, while living at home with his
parents and temporarily away from home, he received assistance with
child support payments, cash, a car, meals, and housing among other
things." No testimony was offered as to the value of these gifts. The
Superior Court of Cobb County, however, attributed $3000 per month in
gift income to the father and included this figure when calculating the
father's support obligation." Gifts of cash or cash equivalents can be
included in a parent's income for the purpose of determining child
support.7 ' The court of appeals determined that it was nevertheless
error to include the gift income because there was no evidence to support
the $3000 value as assigned by the superior court."
In Hendry v. Hendry," the husband's employer reimbursed the
husband for the cost of the family's health insurance premium. The
Superior Court of Gwinnett County included this reimbursement in the
husband's gross income for purposes of calculating child support. The
employer identified the payment as a benefit, not salary." Quoting
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(hX2)(A)(ii)so and O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(fX1)(C),a the
supreme court held that the superior court erred in including the
reimbursement as part of the husband's gross income and remanded the
case for recalculation of the husband's gross income."
Questions about military compensation were answered during this
survey period. In Eldridge v. Eldridge," the supreme court upheld the
Superior Court of Camden County's decision to exclude the husband's

71. Brine, 291 Ga. at 380, 729 S.E.2d at 396-97.
72. 318 Ga. App. 586, 734 S.E.2d 428 (2012).
73. Id. at 588, 734 S.E.2d at 430.
74. Id. at 588-89, 734 S.E.2d at 430-31.
75. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(f)(1)(AXxvii) (2010 & Supp. 2013).
76. Dodson, 318 Ga. App. at 588-89, 734 S.E.2d at 431.
77. 292 Ga. 1, 734 S.E.2d 46 (2012).
78. Id. at 1, 734 S.E.2d at 47.
79. Id.
80. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(h)(2XAXii) (2010 & Supp. 2013).
81. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(f)(1)(C) (2010 & Supp. 2013).
82. Hendry, 292 Ga. at 1-4, 734 S.E.2d at 47-49 (quoting O.C.GA. §§ 19-6-15(h)(2XA)(ii), (f)(1 )2).
83.

291 Ga. 762, 732 S.E.2d 411 (2012).
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sea pay in calculating his income.' The husband, who was in the
Navy, testified that sea pay was incentive pay that he would lose
following a planned relocation to Connecticut.' Under O.C.G.A. § 19-615(fX1XE)," incentive pay is not considered income for child support."
In Black v. Black," the wife claimed the Superior Court of Houston
County erred in excluding from the husband's gross income additional
amounts he received during deployment, such as hazardous-duty pay,
family-separation pay, and tax-free pay." The supreme court upheld
the superior court's opinion that these payments received by the soldier
during deployment amounted to "special pay or incentive pay" properly
excluded under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(f)(1)(E). 90
In Jackson v. Irvin," a deviation based on the fathering of another
child was questioned.9 2 In this paternity and legitimation action, the
father testified that several months before the final hearing he fathered
a child with another woman, though he was currently not under a court
order to provide support for the child. Neither evidence regarding the
other woman's financial status nor evidence regarding the father's
financial support of the child was offered. Regardless, the Superior
Court of Richmond County reduced the father's presumptive child
support obligation by $907 per month based on (among other things) the
existence of the father's second child. The mother claimed it was error
to deviate from the presumptive amount of child support for her child
based on the birth of the father's second child who was not supported by
the father."
The appellate court agreed, holding that sufficient
evidence to support such a deviation was not presented."
VI.

CHILD SUPPORT, MODIFICATION

The child support guidelines must be applied in support modification
actions. In Wetherington v. Wetherington," the parties' October 2007
settlement agreement was incorporated into their final divorce decree in

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 763, 732 S.E.2d at 413.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(f)(1)(E) (2010 & Supp. 2013).
Id.
292 Ga. 691, 740 S.E.2d 613 (2013).
Id. at 699, 740 S.E.2d at 621.
Id. (interpreting O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(fX1XE)).
316 Ga. App. 560, 730 S.E.2d 48 (2012).
Id. at 560, 730 S.E.2d at 49.
Id. at 560-63, 730 S.E.2d at 49-50.
Id. at 563, 730 S.E.2d at 50-51.
291 Ga. 722, 732 S.E.2d 433 (2012).
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January 2008." The final decree stated that the husband's income was
$25,000 per month, and his presumptive child support obligation was to
be $2884 per month, though the parties deviated upward and agreed
that the husband's child support obligation would be $7000 per month.
In October 2008, the husband filed a petition to modify child support
based on a reduction in income. At the final hearing in February 2011,
the husband testified that his $300,000 income listed in the 2007
agreement included a $60,000 signing bonus, a $180,000 salary, and a
$60,000 performance bonus that was never actually earned. The
husband lost his job in 2009, and his new job paid only $152,388 a year.
The Superior Court of Fayette County gave the husband "credit" for his
actual income in 2007, which was $240,000, and because $240,000 is
80% of $300,000, the husband's child support was reduced in accordance
with the 80%, from $7000 to $5600 a month.9 7 The supreme court
reversed in part and held that the superior court failed to consider
whether there had been a substantial change in the husband's financial
circumstances between the time of the divorce decree and the modification hearing, and further failed to apply the child support guidelines in
calculating the new amount."
In East v. Stephens," the parties' 2002 divorce decree incorporated
a settlement requiring the father to pay $125 per week in child support
and one-half of the children's miscellaneous school expenses.' 0 In
2011, this obligation was modified, and the new order required the
father to pay $904 per month in child support.'' The order did not
expressly mention miscellaneous expenses but specified that all
provisions of the incorporated settlement "not modified herein shall
remain in full force and effect."' 02 Soon after, the mother filed a
motion for contempt against the father for not paying half of the
children's miscellaneous expenses, which the Superior Court of Gordon
County granted.'o The supreme court held that the 2011 modification
order discontinued the father's obligation to reimburse one-half of the
miscellaneous expenses, explaining that such an obligation would be a
deviation from the presumptive child support amount, and if the
superior court had intended to continue the father's obligation to pay

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 722, 732 S.E.2d at 435.
Id. at 722-24, 732 S.E.2d at 435-36.
Id. at 722, 726, 732 S.E.2d at 435, 437.
292 Ga. 604, 740 S.E.2d 156 (2013).
Id. at 604, 740 S.E.2d at 156.
Id.
Id. at 604-05, 740 S.E.2d at 156 (quoting the modified divorce decree).
Id. at 605, 740 S.E.2d at 156.
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these expenses, it was required to find a deviation from the presumptive
child support amount and specifically address the miscellaneous
expenses.1o4
VII.

PRENUPTIAL AND POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS

In Fox v. Fox,' the parties divorced in 2000.106 By 2002 they
planned to remarry and, without legal counsel, signed a "Premarital
Agreement" with the notary as the only witness. The parties remarried
three months later. In 2010, the wife filed for divorce and sought to
enforce the Premarital Agreement. The Superior Court of Fulton County
held that the document was a contract made in contemplation of
marriage but was void since it was not attested to by the requisite two
witnesses.o' The supreme court affirmed, holding that while the
parties' contract mentioned the potential of divorce, it did not mention
alimony or property division as would a contract made in contemplation
of divorce.'
A clause of the agreement stating that the wife would
receive monthly compensation of $2500 per month for fifteen years if the
marriage failed was properly viewed as more of a liquidated damages
clause, because compensation was provided in exchange for the wife's
"hardship" of being married to the husband.'09 Such facts are relevant
because a contract made in anticipation of divorce does not require two
witnesses."0
The superior court properly deemed the premartial
agreement a contract in anticipation of marriage, and the agreement
therefore required two attesting witnesses to be valid."'
Ambiguity was the issue in the next two cases. In Newman v.
Newman,"2 the parties added a handwritten provision to their prenuptial agreement stating that "there are certain ambiguities contained
[within] the body of this document [that] each party agrees to clarify and
re-write within [thirty] days of the date of execution hereof.""' During
the parties' divorce, the wife moved to enforce the agreement, while the
husband argued that the parties had an unenforceable "agreement to
agree.""" In affirming the Superior Court of Newton County's deci-

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 605-07, 740 S.E.2d at 156-58.
291 Ga. 492, 731 S.E.2d 676 (2012).
Id. at 492, 731 S.E.2d at 677.
Id. (referencing O.C.GA. § 19-3-63 (2010)).
Id. at 492-94, 731 S.E.2d at 677-78.
Id. at 494-95, 731 S.E.2d at 679.
Id. at 493, 731 S.E.2d at 678.
Id. at 495, 731 S.E.2d at 679.
291 Ga. 635, 732 S.E.2d 77 (2012).
Id. at 635, 732 S.E.2d at 78 (first alteration in original).
Id. (quoting Kreimer v. Kreimer, 274 Ga. 359, 363, 552 S.E.2d 826, 829 (2001)).
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sion, the supreme court found that the agreement itself contained no
language indicating that it was incomplete upon execution and that the
husband failed to identify any essential term to be decided at a future
date."' That a provision of the agreement indicated ambiguities did
not render the agreement unenforceable, as it contained all essential
terms."" As such, the prenuptial agreement was complete and
enforceable." 7
The Superior Court of Fulton County found ambiguity in Eversbusch
v. Eversbusch,"s where the alimony and child support terms of the
parties' handwritten postnuptial agreement (1) provided for payment of
a percentage of the husband's total annual income but did not explain
the method of calculating the total annual income; and (2) assumed the
children would attend and graduate college but provided no alternative
basis for determining alimony if this did not occur." 9 The supreme
court affirmed that such ambiguity rendered the postnuptial agreement
unenforceable. 2 0
VIII.

ALIMONY

In Hardigree v. Smith,'' the Georgia Supreme Court defined the
nature of an alimony obligation.12 The parties' 2010 final divorce
decree provided, with no further restrictions, that the "[h]usband [would]
pay to [the] wife monthly alimony of [$2000] per month for 120
consecutive months beginning April 1, 2010."" The wife remarried
on June 12, 2011, and the husband ceased making alimony payments.
The wife filed a motion for contempt based on the husband's failure to
pay lump sum alimony."' The Superior Court of Hart County ruled
in the husband's favor, finding that his "alimony obligation was for
permanent periodic alimony that terminated upon [the] [wlife's remarriage.""
The appellate court reversed, holding where "the
alimony provision set forth in the trial court's order 'state[s] the exact
amount of each payment .

.

. without other limitations, conditions or

statements of intent, the obligation is one for lump sum alimony payable

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 636, 732 S.E.2d at 78-79.
Id. at 636, 732 S.E.2d at 79.
Id. at 637, 732 8.E.2d at 79.
293 Ga. 60, 743 S.E.2d 418 (2013).
Id. at 62, 743 S.E.2d at 420.
Id. at 62-63, 743 S.E.2d at 420.
291 Ga. 239, 728 S.E.2d 633 (2012).
Id. at 239, 728 S.E.2d at 634.
Id. (quoting the parties' settlement agreement).
Id.
Id.
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This obligation
in installments,' rather than permanent alimony."'
was a lump sum alimony award and did not terminate upon the wife's
remarriage.127
IX.

EQUITABLE DIVIsIoN
28

In Jones-Shaw v. Shaw,' the Superior Court of Gwinnett County
denied the wife's claim for an equitable division of a non-profit corporation started by the husband prior to the parties' marriage, and further
found there was no appreciation in the corporation's value during the
marriage as a result of the wife's efforts.' 29 On appeal, the supreme
court affirmed, stating that for the superior court to determine an asset's
appreciation during the marriage, there must be evidence of the asset's
worth at the time of the marriage and at the time of the divorce.'
Such evidence was not presented in this case-no expert witnesses
testified, and the parties only testified to the asset's worth in general
terms.' 3 '
In United Community Bank v. Pack,"' the court of appeals determined whether a divorce decree divested the former wife of her interest
in real property.' 3 The parties' 2000 divorce decree awarded the wife
three specifically described parcels of land and awarded the husband "all
right, title and interest in any property jointly owned by the parties not
herein awarded to [the wife]."" The husband used the property as
security for loans and subsequently defaulted. The lender brought a
declaratory judgment action asking the court to find that the husband
3 s The court of appeals held that
was the sole owner of the property."
the divorce decree did not have the force and effect of a deed as to the
subject property because it did not describe the property with the
requisite specificity, and the parcel was still jointly owned by the former
husband and wife."'

126.
285 Ga.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 240, 728 S.E.2d at 634 (first alteration in original) (quoting Patel v. Patel,
391, 392, 677 S.E.2d 114, 116 (2009)).
Id.
291 Ga. 252, 728 S.E.2d 646 (2012).
Id. at 252, 728 S.E.2d at 647.
Id. at 252-53, 728 S.E.2d at 647-48.
Id. at 253-54, 728 S.E.2d at 648.
320 Ga. App. 484, 740 S.E.2d 228 (2013).
Id. at 484, 740 S.E.2d at 229.
Id. at 484-85, 740 S.E.2d at 229.
Id. at 485, 740 S.E.2d at 229-30.
Id. at 485-87, 740 S.E.2d at 230-31.
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In Arthur v. Arthur,"' the supreme court reversed the Superior
Court of Decatur County's judgment requiring the wife to pay the
husband $20,000 if and when she refinanced or sold the marital
The supreme court held that an obligation regarding the
home.'
equitable division of marital property cannot be extended for an
indefinite time period.'
X.

CONTEMPT
parties divorced in 1998, and the final
In Baker v.
divorce decree "required [the] [h]usband to refinance in his name the
mortgages for the marital home and the automobile loan," and to assume
all payments on the property within sixty days.'' The husband failed
to comply with the terms of the decree, and a default judgment for the
car loan was entered against the wife in 2002. In 2009, the mortgage
company sent a demand letter to the wife seeking collection of the
outstanding balance of $25,177.44 due on the mortgage. The wife filed
a contempt action in 2009. 142 The husband moved to dismiss, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60," claiming that the judgment was dormant.'" The Superior Court of Cobb County denied the husband's
motion, and the supreme court affirmed, holding that the dormancy
statute only applies to judgments or decrees ordering the payment of
money, not to those that require performance of an act or duty.4 1
Here, the husband was required to perform a specific act.'"
In Ford v. Hanna,'"a question of proper jurisdiction for a contempt
action arose. 4 8 The parties divorced in Gwinnett County and the
husband later moved to DeKalb County. The wife filed a petition in the
Superior Court of DeKalb County to modify child support and visitation,
and simultaneously filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the
husband failed to comply with his child support obligations under the
divorce decree. The husband moved to dismiss the motion for contempt
Schrimsher,4 o the
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138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

293 Ga. 63, 743 S.E.2d 420 (2013).
Id. at 63, 66-67, 743 S.E.2d at 422, 424.
Id. at 67, 743 S.E.2d at 424.
291 Ga. 489, 731 S.E.2d 646 (2012).
Id. at 489, 731 S.E.2d at 647.
Id. at 490, 731 S.E.2d at 647-48.
O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60 (2006).
Baker, 291 Ga. at 490, 731 S.E.2d at 648.
Id. at 490-91, 731 S.E.2d at 648 (interpreting O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60).
Id. at 491, 731 S.E.2d at 648.
292 Ga. 500, 739 S.E.2d 309 (2013).
Id. at 500, 739 S.E.2d at 310.
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for lack of jurisdiction, which the superior court granted. 4 1 The
supreme court reversed and held that when a court acquires jurisdiction
to modify a divorce decree by the filing of a proper petition to modify, it
also obtains jurisdiction to punish for contempt of the divorce decree.so
XI.

APPEAL

In Collins v. Davis,'' the mother filed (1) a petition for modification
of custody, visitation, and child support; (2) a motion for contempt; and
(3) a demand for attorney fees."5 2 The father counterclaimed, seeking
to reduce his child support obligation. The Superior Court of Walton
County entered a final order enforcing a new visitation schedule and
reducing the father's child support. The father filed an application for
discretionary review, challenging the court's order of child support.'
The court of appeals considered whether the father was limited to a
discretionary review or if he was entitled to a direct appeal."' The
court stated that the right to a direct appeal in child custody and
visitation cases under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(11)15 extends to cases
where a party only appeals the child support award, so long as the order
also involves child custody or visitation.156 Thus, even though the
appeal here dealt only with the child support award, because the award
was given in the same order as child custody, it was directly appealable. 157
In Cloud v. Norwood,' 8 the mother directly appealed an order by the
Superior Court of DeKalb County that legitimated her child, incorporated a parenting plan, and continued a child support award from a
previous order. 5 1 The mother specifically appealed the trial court's
legitimation order. Although the order expressly incorporated a
parenting plan, the underlying subject matter of the appeal was
legitimation. 0 The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, holding
that a legitimation action required an application for appeal under

149. Id. at 501, 739 S.E.2d at 310-11.
150. Id. at 501, 503, 739 S.E.2d at 311.
151. 318 Ga. App. 265, 733 S.E.2d 798 (2012).
152. Id. at 265, 733 S.E.2d at 798.
153. Id. at 265, 733 S.E.2d at 798-99.
154. Id. at 265, 733 S.E.2d at 799.
155. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(11) (2013).
156. Collins, 318 Ga. App. at 267, 733 S.E.2d at 799-800 (interpreting O.C.G.A.
34(a)(11)).
157. Id. at 268-69, 733 S.E.2d at 801.
158. 321 Ga. App. 218, 739 S.E.2d 93 (2013).
159. Id. at 218, 739 S.E.2d at 93.
160. Id.
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O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(aX2),161 and the court therefore did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.6 2
XII.

ATTORNEY FEES

6

In Horn v. Shepherd,' s the husband was held in contempt for failing
to pay $8,408.03 in past due support, medical expenses, and attorney
fees."* The trial court ordered the husband to be incarcerated until
he purged himself of the contempt by paying the amount he had been
previously ordered to pay, as well as $2500 in attorney fees associated
with the contempt action."6 ' Because a "trial court does not have the
authority to make payment of a new attorney fees award a condition for
purging contempt of a previous order," the Georgia Supreme Court held
that the Superior Court of Coweta County erred in requiring the
husband to pay the $2500 to purge the contempt order. 16 6 However,
the order requiring the husband to pay the new attorney fees remained
valid, thus he would be subject to a future contempt action if he failed
to do so. 67
In Jarvis v. Jarvis,'68 the husband contended the Superior Court of
Forsyth County abused its discretion in considering gift income received
from his mother to determine his financial status pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 19-6-2169 for the purpose of awarding attorney fees.170 The husband testified that his mother had provided financial support during the
marriage, and while she was no longer providing financial support, she
was, at the time of trial, helping him make "payments."'7 ' The
supreme court held that there is no statutory limit on the type of
financial circumstances the court may consider in an attorney fees
award, and therefore, the superior court did not err in considering this

gift income.172
In Fedina v. Larichev,"' the Superior Court of Cobb County's award
to the former husband of $12,000 in attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(aX2) (2013).
Cloud, 321 Ga. App. at 218,739 S.E.2d at 93 (interpreting O.C.GA § 5-6-35(a)(2)).
292 Ga. 14, 732 S.E.2d 427 (2012).
Id. at 14, 21, 732 S.E.2d at 429, 433.
Id.
Id. at 21, 732 S.E.2d at 433.
Id.
291 Ga. 818, 733 S.E.2d 747 (2012).
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 (2010).
Jarvis,291 Ga. at 818, 733 S.E.2d at 748.
Id. at 820, 733 S.E.2d at 749.
Id. (interpreting O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2).
322 Ga. App. 76, 744 S.E.2d 72 (2013).
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The court of appeals held that the
award may have been reasonable, but the superior court's order was
nevertheless deficient because it did not indicate how the court
apportioned its award of fees based on the former wife's sanctionable
conduct. 171

174. O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (2006).
175. Fedina, 322 Ga. App. at 81, 744 S.E.2d at 77.
176. Id. (interpreting O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14).

